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Missile Defense in Asia

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Policy Paper

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OF THE UNITED STATES

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Table of Contents

<i>Foreword</i>	v
<i>Key Judgments</i>	vii
Japan.....	vii
South Korea	ix
Taiwan.....	x
China	xi
India.....	xiii
I. The Asian Strategic Context.....	1
II. U.S. Missile Defense Programs	2
III. Multinational Cooperation on Missile Defenses	4
IV. Japan.....	5
Nature of the Threat.....	5
Political Context	6
Architecture.....	8
Eyeing the Future.....	9
V. South Korea.....	15
Nature of the Threat.....	15
Political Context	17
Architecture.....	18
Eyeing the Future.....	18
VI. Taiwan.....	19
Nature of the Threat.....	19
Political Context	20
Architecture.....	21
Eyeing the Future.....	23
VII. China	23
PRC Missile Deployments	23
Political Context	24
Eyeing the Future.....	26

VIII. India	26
Nature of the Threat	26
Political Context	27
Architecture	28
Eyeing the Future	28
IX. Concluding Observations and Recommendations	29
So Far So Good	29
Far Yet To Go	29
Japan	30
South Korea	31
Taiwan	31
China	32
India	32
<i>Acronyms</i>	34

Foreword

The U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, foreshadowed by several years of intense debate within the United States, ushered in a new phase of the nuclear age after the 40-year dominance of the idea of assured destruction. This change of strategic approach resulted from several factors, including notably the continuing spread of nuclear and missile technologies and the end of the Soviet-U.S. nuclear rivalry. It has forced U.S. allies and potential rivals alike to review long-held ideas. In particular, they have had to consider the implications for their own policies of the new U.S. priority for deploying missile defenses.

In 2000, the Council asked Stephen Cambone, Ivo Daalder and Stephen Hadley to visit Europe. The purpose of their visit was to have in-depth discussions with political, military and business leaders on all aspects of missile defense, including threat assessments, strategic implications, and the likely consequences of missile defense developments for the future security environment and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This visit resulted in the report *European Views of National Missile Defense*, published in September 2000. By way of complementing this first assessment, the Council asked General Michael Carns, USAF (Ret.), Dr. Jacques Gansler and Walter B. Slocombe to undertake a similar visit to Asia. This report is the result of that visit, which took place in mid-November 2002 and which involved meetings in Beijing, New Delhi, Seoul, Taipei and Tokyo.

The views expressed in this report reflect the consensus of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Atlantic Council. The Council would like to thank the organizations and individuals who helped organize the valuable meetings that informed the delegation's work. In China, these included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the China Institute of International Studies, the China Association for International Understanding, and the U.S. Embassy. In Japan, these included the Japan Defense Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Okazaki Institute, the Keizai Doyukai and the U.S. Embassy. In Korea, these included the three major political parties, the New Strategy Institute of Korea, and the U.S. Embassy. In Taiwan, these included the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the National Security Council and the American Institute in Taiwan. In India, these included the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. Embassy.

On behalf of the Council, I would like to express great appreciation to Mike Carns, Jacques Gansler and Walt Slocombe for making available the time to undertake this project and for the substantial intellectual commitment they each made to ensuring that it was so productive. Also, I would like to thank Dick Nelson, the Director of the Council's Program on International Security, who masterminded the project, arranged and participated in the visits in Asia and undertook the additional leg of the trip to India. Finally, I would like to thank the Stuart Family Foundation and the Council's Director Robert D. Stuart, without whose support this project would not have been possible.

Christopher J. Makins, President, Atlantic Council of the United States

Key Judgments

The prospect of North Korea developing both nuclear weapons and long-range missiles has been at the core of the U.S. rationale for early deployment of a missile defense and of Japan's interest in defense for itself. In the face of North Korea's missile programs and its acknowledgement of an active program to develop nuclear weapons, the problem of defense against those weapons assumes new urgency – as does the question of how defenses affect the broader dynamic of security in Northeast Asia.

Beyond the North Korean threat, the degree to which the United States builds defenses for itself and assists others in the Asia-Pacific region in deploying such defenses is linked to the long-term question of the role of the United States in Asia-Pacific security, of its continuing commitment and presence, of the degree to which missile defense is a central factor in that role, of the durability of U.S. bilateral alliances, and of the posture of the United States and China toward each other.

The long lead times for developing and deploying missile defenses, combined with the transparency of programs and regular briefings abroad by U.S. officials, suggest that deployment of missile defenses need not be destabilizing. Most of the systems currently in research and development will probably not be ready for fielding for several years and, even when they are deployed, China should be confident that they do not pose a threat to its deterrent capabilities. Indeed, limited missile defense capabilities should not be seen to threaten the regional military balance, although they would provide an important measure of defense against the North Korean threat and blackmail by North Korea and others, as well as against errant missile launches.

Japan

Political Context

North Korea's missile and nuclear programs create more impetus than heretofore for Japan to move toward a commitment to a defense against ballistic missile attack, but the decision is far from made. There are important technical, industrial, and military questions to be addressed, as well as political and economic issues. The broad strategic context – especially the looming North Korean problem and the long-term challenge of China – will have a major impact on Japanese decision-making in this area. But the issue also presents fundamental questions about the U.S.-Japanese security relationship, if only because any Japanese missile defense will be closely linked to – but must be clearly distinct from – U.S. programs and must fit into the broad framework of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Accordingly, close consultation and cooperation between the U.S. and Japanese governments will be vital.

While North Korea provides the short-term context, China provides the long-term challenge. Japanese policy makers, no less than the public, recognize that the gradual modernization of China will almost certainly be the dominant factor in Japan's long-term security situation, and hence a factor in its decisions on missile defense. On one hand,

advocates of missile defense recognize – and the more enthusiastic proclaim – that a side benefit of a defense against North Korea’s threat is that it would offer some potential protection vis-à-vis China. Others, however, maintain with equal conviction – and a good deal more public credibility – that a key principle of Japan’s security policy should be avoiding actions that will exacerbate relations with China unless they have clear justification. These Japanese argue that China will view any Japanese missile defense with deep suspicion, and that defenses could be the reason, or at least the pretext, for a dangerous increase in tension with China.

In the face of North Korean missile and nuclear weapons programs – and with growing Chinese military power in the background – there is a “peculiarly Japanese” logic to building a missile defense. Missile defenses are, by definition, defensive in character and therefore they potentially present fewer problems than other advanced military systems for Japan’s “peace constitution”, which rejects the use of military force as an instrument of national policy and has been understood to limit Japan’s forces to the defense of Japan itself. Moreover, with a Japanese nuclear deterrent barred by both constitutional arrangements and national sentiment, missile defense is an obvious option.

However, no political decision has been made to go forward with such a program. In Japan, even more than in other countries, a military program like this with important policy and financial implications will only proceed if it commands broad support. Missile defense already has strong support in traditional conservative and security-minded circles, but, on the other side, some traditional left-wing and pacifist groups will probably never support it. Concern about proliferation and the potential of new direct threats to Japan, as well as a modest move toward a more active Japanese international security role, suggest increasing support for missile defense. However, broad elements of Japanese public opinion – and powerful forces in the media – maintain a fundamental aversion to a greater Japanese military role. For missile defense to become a serious element in Japanese military programs, therefore, there remains a large set of uncommitted groups whose support must be won.

As the United States continues cooperation with Japan on missile defense, care must be taken to avoid actions that may be perceived as intended to influence the political decision-making process in Japan. U.S. pressure on Japan to deploy missile defenses would likely be counterproductive both in regard to the decision and to the broader U.S.-Japanese security relationship.

Architecture

The favored architecture for Japanese missile defense involves a combination of an upgraded ship-based Aegis-derived system, to be developed and produced in cooperation with the United States, along with a ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, to be purchased. An appropriate combination of these would, as a technical matter, give fairly good coverage for all of Japan.

South Korea

Political Context

While missile defense is a major current policy and procurement issue for Japan, almost the opposite is true in South Korea. This is somewhat surprising given the crisis generated by North Korea. By framing the problem in terms of U.S.-North Korean relations, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK's) pressures have not resulted in significant interest on the part of South Korea in pressing ahead on missile defenses.

At the same time, the U.S.-South Korean security relationship has come under unprecedented strain. Both sides need to reiterate that the relationship remains important to the security of the two nations and to stability in the region as a whole. Thus policy on specific issues should be developed in the context of that necessary relationship. This encompasses U.S. decisions on adapting force deployments as well as South Korean policy toward the North, specific measures to deal with the North Korean threat and South Korean attitudes toward the U.S. military presence.

South Koreans, it appears, are broadly convinced that North Korea is so weak that nothing – except possibly U.S. provocation – could induce it to attempt a military move. Accordingly, they view North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs as primarily an effort to give the DPRK some means to threaten Japan and ultimately the United States, but not as a serious increase in the threat to South Korea itself.

At the same time, there is widespread concern in South Korea that the United States exaggerates, not so much North Korea's military potential, as the prospect of its use and that the U.S. government unjustifiably discounts both the costs of a confrontation to South Korea and the potential of a policy of cooperation with the North. Moreover, the inevitable tensions of a large U.S. military presence are, for many South Koreans, less and less acceptable since, for many, the U.S. presence no longer seems necessary for their nation's protection.

These divergent perspectives have a major impact on South Korean views of missile defense. While the United States had deployed Patriot batteries to South Korea, and (at least prior to the Iraq war) had given U.S. forces there top priority for PAC-3 deployment, South Korea has evinced practically no interest in missile defenses. In light of the policies of the new president and the general tendency to discount the possibility of war with the North, that position seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Architecture

Even if basic South Korean attitudes and policies were very much more convinced of a danger from North Korea, South Korea would be unlikely to have great interest in acquiring a missile defense, simply because of differences in the character of the threat South Korea faces. The 10,000-odd North Korean artillery pieces deployed near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) can range deep into the suburbs of Seoul and the 2,000 or so rocket launchers can cover the whole conurbation. Nor are more distant parts of the Republic of Korea (ROK) easily defensible against missile attack. North Korea is the world's leading producer of short

range SCUD-type missiles and their *Nodong* derivatives, and it is assessed to have an inventory of many hundred. These weapons are able to cover the whole of South Korea in large numbers, making the possibility of effective national defense highly problematic.

The United States will continue to deploy missile defenses to protect high value targets, like key airfields, ports, and command centers, as well as U.S. forces. However, strictly from a military point of view, a meaningful defense of South Korea against even the SCUD/*Nodong* element of the North Korean threat is infeasible using systems now being deployed and developed. South Korean investment in military systems would, from this perspective, be better devoted to systems with more potential than missile defense.

Taiwan

Political Context

For Taiwan, the issue of missile defense, like every other military, security, and foreign policy issue, is an aspect of its uneasy relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) – a relationship that in the military field amounts to confrontation.

In this context, missiles play a major role in the threat that Taiwan faces. Beijing has amassed about 400 missiles within range of Taiwan and could easily augment this force by moving similar missiles deployed elsewhere in China. This gives China the ability to threaten Taiwan in a crisis.

Given these circumstances, it is difficult to envision the United States ruling out providing Taiwan with access to missile defenses that would blunt, if not defeat, any hypothetical use of PRC missiles. U.S. policy on missile defense for Taiwan should be geared to the scale of the threat and Taiwan's self-defense needs. Also, the United States should refuse any proposals by China to trade a "freeze" on further missile deployments opposite Taiwan for a ban on U.S. missile defense assistance – much less limits on broader U.S. military sales to Taiwan. Any such freeze by China would still leave a large unanswered threat in being.

But as with every other aspect of cross-Strait relations, there is a strong political dimension to the missile defense issue. To some on Taiwan, and to some of Taiwan's supporters in the United States, U.S. cooperation in Taiwan's acquisition of a missile defense is most important not for the military effectiveness of a defense, but as a test of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan's defense. To Beijing – and to some others in the region and in the United States – U.S. cooperation in a missile defense for Taiwan would be a political act far beyond its military implications because it would, they contend, cross a PRC "red line." Moreover, Beijing maintains that the nature of missile defense is such that any system defending Taiwan would necessarily have so many links to the United States' own systems (and perhaps to a putative Japanese defense) as to create an integrated U.S.-ROC defense, and, in substance if not in form, restore the U.S.-ROC military security alliance whose termination was part of the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in 1979.

Architecture

For Taiwan, the PRC missile force represents a real threat and therefore stimulates interest in possible defenses, especially ship-based Aegis-derived and ground-based Patriot-type systems. In the short run at least, there are serious practical and priority problems with building such defenses, not to mention the disadvantages of risking a major confrontation with the PRC – and possibly asking the United States to take a step that it would regard as unnecessarily undermining its relationship with the PRC. However, there are also powerful voices on Taiwan that insist that there must be some response to the missile threat, and that a limited defense would only entail manageable diplomatic costs while paying substantial psychological and military dividends.

Realization of the potential military and political implications of the PRC missile buildup has, naturally, led Taiwan to consider the options for deploying an active defense and to take some preliminary steps. For example, Taiwan has been acquiring a Taiwan-unique upgrade of the anti-aircraft Patriot system, roughly equivalent in capability to the Patriot 2. In addition, the United States has agreed to sell Taiwan both a phased array radar system and Kidd-class destroyers with surface-to-air missiles. None of these systems constitutes, in any sense, missile defenses. The United States has consistently maintained that these programs have no meaningful anti-missile capability, and indeed they have none.

Nevertheless, the line between sophisticated air defenses and missile defenses will grow increasingly blurred in the coming years, and each element of the ROC program is potentially part of a foundation for a future missile defense of Taiwan.

At the same time, both the United States and Taiwan should recognize that missile defenses, quite apart from any adverse political implications for cross-Strait and U.S.-Chinese relations, would provide for only very limited defense, given the scale of the PRC capabilities. Furthermore, missile defense costs would be high and compete with other, arguably higher-priority, needs to modernize and reform Taiwan's military capabilities. Therefore, the scale and character of U.S.-ROC cooperation on missile defenses should, like other defense cooperation, be geared to both real military needs and the overall strategic interests of the two sides, and not become a test either of the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan or of Taiwan's commitment to its own self-defense.

China

Political Context

China seems to have concluded that the United States will go ahead with some form of national missile defense, and that it is no longer an option for China to build a strong front with Russia to extract a heavy political cost from the United States for doing so, much less to stop the program. That being the case, China has nothing to gain from suggesting publicly that the program is a great threat to Chinese interests, and every incentive to discount the effort as a pointless diversion from the United States' real priorities.

The Chinese are clearly opposed to potential U.S.-Japanese missile defense cooperation. However, this opposition is in the context of general concern about an expanded Japanese role in Asia-Pacific security overall, rather than specific objections to Japan having a missile

defense as such. Not surprisingly, given China's focus on Taiwan specifically and on Japan as a resurgent regional power generally, the most pointed Chinese criticism of the Japanese effort was that a Japanese defense would be interlinked with the United States and Taiwan to form a regional ballistic missile defense system, directed not at North Korea or other 'rogue states,' but at China.

Predictably, the strongest Chinese concern about missile defense is related to possible U.S. support for a system that would defend Taiwan. Any U.S. decision to sell Taiwan a missile defense system, much less to cooperate in its installation and operation, would likely set off a major crisis in U.S.-Chinese relations. Significantly, these objections are not related primarily to the prospect of Taiwan having some defense, but to missile defense cooperation as a symbol of renewed U.S.-ROC military cooperation. This perception is being fed by those on Taiwan who see missile defense as a test of U.S. resolve. China regards cooperation on ballistic missile defense as in a separate and even more objectionable category than other U.S. military sales to Taiwan. In the Chinese view, all military sales of any significance violate what China views as President Reagan's commitment in the 1981 communiqué gradually to reduce and eventually to eliminate such sales. They also maintain that missile defense cooperation would necessarily entail such extensive and close exchange of data and operational linkages as to amount to a *de facto* revival of the U.S.-ROC security alliance, which, as previously mentioned, the United States agreed to discontinue as part of the 1979 arrangements for normalization. As such, missile defense cooperation is unique in that it violates both the 1979 and 1981 undertakings, as interpreted by the PRC.

China shares with the United States and its regional allies, including Japan and South Korea, an interest in preventing North Korea from acquiring mature missile and nuclear weapons capabilities. These countries also share an interest in a stable and constructive U.S.-Chinese strategic relationship. U.S. missile defense policy needs to recognize these broad common interests.

Some degree of negative Chinese reaction to U.S. missile defense efforts is unavoidable. However, China has no "right" to unchallenged missile dominance in the region. And in any case, the actual capability of defenses now under development will be very limited against the missile capability, both intercontinental and regional, that China will have by the time the defenses are operational.

U.S. policy on missile defense cooperation in the region should therefore combine firmness about U.S. commitments to its alliance relationships with a sustained effort to maintain a constructive, non-confrontational relationship with China. Multi-level dialogue and transparency, as well as modulation of rhetoric, will be key elements in such an effort.

Architecture

Decisions on the "real" Chinese response in terms of military programs to a U.S. missile defense will be made in highly restricted government and party circles and manifested publicly only as the actions decided upon work their way through development, testing, and deployment. One likely element of the Chinese response is a greater commitment to a more survivable, and probably more numerous, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force.

However, given that the effort to develop such a capability began long ago, and that the originally planned pace and scale of that effort is unknown, the outside world may quite possibly not know for a long time, if ever, how strongly U.S. missile defense programs affected Chinese ICBM modernization.

It would appear to be in the U.S. interest to provide as much transparency as possible regarding U.S. missile defense programs so that China is not encouraged to hasten its modernization programs, since the U.S. systems – as planned – are not intended to handle the sophisticated Chinese threat and would have only the most limited capability to do so. The United States should consider the potential of an arrangement to share early warning information with China, on the model of existing cooperation with Russia.

India

Political Context

India was quick to endorse publicly President Bush's missile defense initiatives in 2001. This move surprised many strategic thinkers in India because the missile defense issue had not been widely debated and the endorsement seemed to represent a departure from India's traditional opposition to U.S. hegemony and unilateralism. The move also signaled closer strategic alignment between India and the United States after relations were strained by India's 1998 nuclear weapons tests.

A few months after the Indian endorsement of U.S. missile defense programs, the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States opened still other, new opportunities to reverse the earlier downturn in security relations. By 2002, Russia, China and India no longer posed the kind of strong international opposition to U.S. missile defense programs noted only a few years earlier. India and the United States are now "natural allies," according to the Indian Prime Minister.

This strategic shift, including support for U.S. missile defense programs, enjoys broad backing in both of the leading political parties in India. Part of the attraction of missile defense in India is that it focuses on the problem of missile proliferation. India has been powerless to deal with the proliferation of Chinese missiles and technology to Pakistan. From this viewpoint, many Indians are hopeful that U.S. missile defense technology will provide a counter to the proliferation of Chinese missile technology. To the extent that India can gain access to related U.S. technology, a U.S. missile defense might also complicate military planning in Pakistan.

While China is often cited in India as a potential long-term threat, that relationship is now being managed well by both sides. They continue to work on border and other issues through regular, high-level meetings. China, in particular, has consistently moved to reduce tensions with India in recent years.

Architecture

Even though the Pakistani missile threat has been characterized as "too many, too close", India is still interested in exploring missile defenses that might be helpful in preventing

blackmail, even if they fall short of providing an effective defense against a large scale missile attack. As a result, Russian, Israeli and U.S. missile defense systems are of interest. India is also interested in missile defense research collaboration with the United States. The benefits of research and development across the wide range of technologies involved in missile defense are attractive because of their potential applications well beyond the missile defense arena. While Indian officials are fully aware of tight U.S. restrictions on technology transfer, they also point out that India has done an excellent job in controlling its own nuclear weapons and missile technology, despite strong interest on the part of other countries. India also has expressed an interest in purchasing other U.S. arms in an effort to diversify arms suppliers.

Missile Defense in Asia

I. The Asian Strategic Context

Missile defenses involve far more than simply technical responses to technical problems; they have a profound policy and strategic dimension. First of all, missile defenses are part, but only part, of the response to the challenge of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. Second, issues of other countries' cooperation with the United States on defenses – whether for the United States itself or for their own territory – usually raise sensitive issues for the relationships between those countries and their neighbors. Third, on the strategic dimension, missile defenses affect strategic stability in terms of the U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons balance, despite Russia's very mild response to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

In the context of Asian security and Asian relationships, the following elements are of particular importance:

- The prospect of the United States deploying a national missile defense or cooperating with others in the region on their own defenses impacts on the U.S.-Chinese relationship because of Chinese concerns – and the hopes of at least some national missile defense (NMD) advocates in the United States – that such a defense would call into question China's capability to attack the United States (and others in the region) with nuclear weapons.
- The prospect of North Korea developing both nuclear weapons and long-range missiles has been at the core of the U.S. rationale for early deployment of a missile defense – and of Japanese interest in defense for itself. In the face of North Korean missile programs and its acknowledgement of an active program to develop nuclear weapons, the problem of defense against those weapons assumes new urgency, as does the question of how defenses affect the broader dynamic of security in North East Asia.
- For those most likely to be interested in cooperation with the United States on missile defenses – Japan and Taiwan – military programs, and in particular, those that involve close cooperation with the United States, raise much broader domestic and international political concerns rooted in history and geopolitics.

- The question of the degree to which the United States builds defenses for itself and assists others in the Asia-Pacific region in providing such defenses for themselves is linked to the long-term questions of the role of the United States in Asia-Pacific security, of its continuing commitment and presence, of the degree to which military defense is a central factor in that role, of the durability of U.S. bilateral alliances and of the posture of the United States and China toward each other.
- Although India, Pakistan and China all publicly claim that their nuclear weapons posture will be guided by a doctrine of “minimum deterrence”, they have not developed measures that provide much confidence in their ability to maintain strategic stability.

II. U.S. Missile Defense Programs

The United States has been working, since the end of the Cold War, to define its policy and programs for ballistic missile defense in the drastically changed geopolitical context. The Clinton administration, drawing on the lessons of the Gulf War and perceptions of the shape of future conflicts, initially gave high priority to development of systems oriented to defending deployed forces and key facilities in the theater in which a conflict might occur. They also became increasingly concerned at the possibility that the timetable for “rogue state” regimes to develop missiles capable of reaching the United States might be much shorter than earlier estimated.

Under heavy pressure from Congress to move rapidly toward a defense of the U.S. homeland, the Clinton-era program grew to include an effort to develop and deploy on an accelerated schedule a system able to provide high-confidence defense against the sort of limited ballistic missile attacks on U.S. territory of which rogue states would be initially capable. In parallel with the technical development programs, the Clinton team, while continuing to maintain that bilateral arms control agreements with Russia, and specifically the ABM Treaty, were the foundation of strategic stability, began discussions with the Russian government over possible modification of the treaty to permit limited defenses and to clarify the distinction between “strategic” defenses, which the treaty constrained, and “non-strategic” defenses, which were unlimited.

The national defense system then envisaged – the so-called Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) program – for the most part used already-developed technology. In addition, numerous theater defense systems had been in development for many years.¹ Nonetheless, the actual

¹ These include: Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), a mobile, ground-based, short-range system now in production and being deployed by the U.S. Army; Theater High Altitude Antimissile Defense (THAAD), a land-based, upper-atmosphere system under development by the U.S. Army; Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a highly mobile, land-based, short-range system using the PAC-3 missile, under joint development by the United States, Germany, and Italy for protection of ground troops; Arrow, a land-based, atmospheric long-range system jointly developed by the United States and Israel, now deployed in Israel; Navy Area-Wide (NAW), a short-range, ship-based system terminated in 2002; Navy Theater-Wide (NTW), a longer-range, exoatmospheric, ship-based system with some joint research by Japan (a next generation NTW system is under consideration for a boost-phase and ascent-phase intercept); and Airborne Laser (ABL), an aircraft-based system with a high-energy laser for boost-phase kill of ballistic missiles.

development of operationally reliable systems – for both the theater and the national defense missions – remained, and, for the most part, still remains to be completed.

Significant progress has been made in both areas, but test failures in the NMD program and quality control problems in the theater programs have meant schedule delays as well as cost increases. Moreover, Russia proved unwilling to deal seriously with the issue of treaty modification, at least so long as its interlocutor was an administration whose days were numbered and whose successor was uncertain. In August 2000, President Clinton announced that, while the United States would continue to work on a limited national missile defense system, he had decided to defer a decision on deployment.

The Bush Administration came to office with none of the ambivalence about missile defenses that characterized its predecessor. It inherited with sincere enthusiasm both the legacy of prior Republican administrations' commitment to national missile defense and their deep skepticism about the continuing utility of traditional arms control approaches. Within a year, the United States secured the more or less reluctant acquiescence of the Russian government in U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, and moved to define its own approach to missile defense development.

The basic contours of the U.S. program, as defined by the newly renamed Missile Defense Agency, continued all but one of the theater defense programs.² A key objective of the program remains developing a means of defending the territory of the United States against the potential capabilities of regimes like those of North Korea or Iran and against small accidental or unauthorized launches, while abjuring any ambition to defend against even Chinese, much less Russian, capabilities. Instead of concentrating on a single system for the earliest possible deployment, a range of technologies is to be explored, including sea- and air-basing, with no particular approach favored *a priori*.³ Moreover, there is no commitment to any particular deployment and no particular deadline for completion, other than adapting certain new test facilities in Alaska so they can be used to provide an early – late 2004 – but very limited emergency defense capability against ICBM-range attacks.

However, despite these elements of program continuity, the administration argues that its effort is conceptually different, and, in particular, more comprehensive. With the ABM Treaty no longer a constraint, the distinction between “strategic” or national, and “non-strategic” or theater defenses is no longer relevant. Work continues on the ground-based system for mid-course intercepts of long-range missiles, but there are also programs to explore the potential of boost-phase intercept, using air- or sea-based platforms.

² The U.S. Navy's ship-based, short-range “area defense” system was terminated in 2002 for cost and technical reasons, but the longer-range NTW system continues to be developed.

³ All missile defense concepts, of course, rely heavily on satellite sensors and communications. However, for a variety of reasons, no serious work is being done on missile defenses in which the actual destruction devices – whether interceptor, laser beam, or something else – would be launched from space platforms.

III. Multinational Cooperation on Missile Defenses

U.S. missile defense programs have long included multi-national elements. Several U.S. allies have purchased various derivatives of the Patriot system for defense against short-range ballistic missiles and a few joint development programs are underway. Japan is currently involved in research collaboration and more joint efforts have been discussed. Conceptually, these efforts have not been limited to theater systems. Indeed, for many U.S. allies defensive systems that are, in technical terms, “theater” defenses because they are optimized to counter relatively short-range missiles, are, in strategic terms, “national” defenses because they would serve to protect more or less completely the national territory of the country operating them.

President Clinton spoke of sharing the technology and coverage of missile defenses with other “civilized” nations, and there were tentative discussions of the requirements and potential mechanisms of such sharing in the context of broader consultations with allies over U.S. NMD efforts. Under the Bush administration this aspect of missile defense has moved from the margins to be more nearly a centerpiece of the U.S. program. President Bush has proclaimed that:

Because the threats of the 21st century also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against them. The Defense Department will develop and deploy missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also our friends and allies.⁴

The U.S. missile defense program is considered by its managers to be intended to be multinational in terms both of participation in development and production and of deployment and coverage. A range of countries has been briefed on the various programs under way and on the opportunities for participation by non-U.S. industries. More broadly, concepts are being developed to extend coverage to allies and friends who seek it, including the difficult issues of how much foreign defensive systems would rely on U.S. support, especially for warning and communications, and of how decision-making authority would be allocated and controlled in a context in which timelines for action would be extremely short.

Attention to multinational aspects of missile defense serves U.S. interests. International acceptance of and support for U.S. missile defense measures is politically important, and, more concretely, most concepts for defense of the United States embody system elements that depend, to a greater or lesser extent, on the cooperation of other countries.⁵ Securing both political support and practical cooperation may well require that the United States help do what is necessary to extend protection to the foreign countries involved, because their leaders and publics may well conclude that giving the support sought increases the risk that they will themselves become a target, particularly if the United States is rendered less vulnerable by the very defenses in whose building or deployment they have cooperated.

⁴ President George W. Bush, “President Announces Progress in Missile Defense Capabilities,” White House address, Office of the Press Secretary: December 17, 2002.

⁵ The GBI system, in particular, is likely to rely heavily on large ground-based radars for surveillance and detection. For example, two of these are outside U.S. territory – in Thule, Greenland and Fylingdales in the United Kingdom. Even notional systems that do not require such direct use of foreign real estate will depend on communications links through other countries.

Similar in logic, but perhaps more cynical or more practical in application, allowing foreign companies to participate in U.S. missile defense programs has the potential to create economic incentives for foreign governments to give political and practical support to U.S. missile defense programs and policies.

But there is a more general sense in which the issue of defenses cannot be limited to protection of the U.S. homeland alone. President Reagan's Star Wars vision included extending the benefits worldwide – even, somehow, to the Soviet Union. As the threat to be defended against has narrowed technically, while broadening geographically, to focus on the rogue state problem, the question of defenses that cover the United States' allies and friends has become even more salient. In part, the question of defense of other nations arises because they, like the United States, are potential targets of attack, and therefore see protection against such attacks as an aspect of the most traditional of defense missions – protection of the homeland against direct attack.

From the U.S. point of view, however, whether allies and friends are open to missile attack is more than just a question of sympathetic concern for the populations of nations whose security is important to our own or even of a reasonable *quid pro quo* for cooperation that is needed if the United States itself is to be defended; it arises from the strategic logic of national missile defenses. The core argument for defenses against rogue states, logically, is the desirability of denying a would-be regional aggressor the leverage of long-range missiles armed with highly destructive weapons. A defense – however effective – whose coverage is limited to U.S. territory, would have a serious weakness if it left exposed both U.S. friends and allies (whose active cooperation and support would likely be essential to effective U.S. aid to the target of aggression) and U.S. deployed forces. Also, if missile defenses were limited to U.S. territory, the risk to U.S. allies may increase because they present easier targets that can be overwhelmed by large numbers of mobile, short-range missiles.

IV. Japan

Nature of the Threat

Of the countries in Asia, Japan has perhaps the most focused attention to the missile defense issue.⁶ Japan has, for some years, had a low-level program of cooperative research with the United States on sea-based missile defenses. Recent tensions with North Korea have stimulated new attention to the prospect of building a missile defense for Japan in cooperation with the United States.

North Korea has, since at least the mid 1990s, possessed fully tested and operational *Nodong* missiles that are capable of reaching most, if not all, of Japan. The 1998 North Korean test

⁶ It bears emphasis that virtually all the Japanese officials, political figures, and experts we talked to were strong supporters of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship and, to a greater or lesser degree, also of a missile defense for Japan. We did not meet with anyone who was a declared opponent of missile defenses, much less of the basic security relationship. However, our interlocutors – and the U.S. embassy officials with whom we met – were candid in acknowledging that missile defense remains highly controversial in Japan and in outlining the nature of the concerns of those who are inclined to oppose a Japanese program.

of a potentially much longer range *Taepodong* missile actually passed over Japanese territory. This highly publicized event greatly heightened Japanese awareness of the North Korean missile threat. The test stimulated debate in Japan, not only because it underscored Japan's potential vulnerability to North Korean attack, but because, in Japanese eyes at least, it raised questions about Japan's dependence on the United States. Some Japanese, including in official circles, have been critical of the United States for allegedly not having warned Japan adequately of the impending test and have discerned an effort to discount the test's significance in the supposed U.S. intelligence assessment that the test may have been, as North Korea claims, an effort to put a satellite in orbit rather than a major step toward a long range attack capability.⁷ Whatever the merits of these concerns – and the U.S. officials concerned sharply dispute their factual premises – the test made obvious not just to Japanese concerned with security issues but to the public at large that Japan is within reach of North Korean missiles and that the United States does not, at present at least, have any means of defending Japanese territory against that threat.

Political Context

To some degree, the urgency of the missile threat as a political issue was temporarily reduced in the years after 1998 by North Korean agreement – under heavy pressure from both the United States and Japan – to a moratorium on further missile flight tests.⁸ For a time there also appeared to be a reasonably good prospect of a U.S.-North Korean agreement that would have stopped North Korean work on long-range missiles in exchange for political and economic concessions by the United States and Japan. Moreover, Japan until very recently, had been pursuing a policy, in parallel with South Korea's "sunshine policy," of reconciliation with Pyongyang.

That Japanese effort, however, was virtually halted soon after Prime Minister Koizumi's precedent-breaking visit to Pyongyang in September 2002. North Korea's acknowledgement, in October 2002, that it has a covert program to enrich uranium in violation of the 1994 "Framework Agreement" and other international obligations has called renewed attention to the potential threat to Japan. Perhaps even more significant in terms of Japanese public opinion, North Korea's admission that its security services had kidnapped Japanese citizens and held them for decades has had a profound impact on Japanese views of North Korea. These abductions seem to have had at least as much impact on the thinking of ordinary Japanese as the missile tests and nuclear programs. In a society that regards itself as close-knit and homogeneous, many ordinary Japanese were deeply upset by the human tragedy of the abductions. The result was much greater suspicion of the Pyongyang regime

⁷ One part of the Japanese response to the 1998 test was a commitment to build a Japanese intelligence satellite system. Whether the system would actually contribute to Japanese understanding of developments in North Korea and elsewhere commensurate with its costs is debatable, but the Japanese government has seen the effort as a critical, if largely symbolic, indication that Japan is not entirely dependent on U.S.-supplied information.

⁸ The moratorium on flight testing has not necessarily meant a halt to North Korean missile development, as there is reportedly intelligence information that the DPRK has been continuing work on larger missile engines and other non-flight-test activity, and may be securing flight test data from tests of Pakistani missiles derived from North Korean designs.

– and great frustration with the Japanese government’s essentially conciliatory approach to North Korea.⁹

A consequence of both the military developments and the abduction affair has been a more critical view of North Korea and, in some circles at least, greater interest in potential defenses against North Korean capabilities to attack Japan. Also, some argue that missile defenses are desirable as they might preclude Japan from being held “hostage” by threats of missile attack.

In the face of the aforementioned North Korean missile and nuclear weapons programs – and with growing Chinese military power in the background – there is a “peculiarly Japanese” logic to building a missile defense. Missile defenses are, by definition, defensive in character and therefore present fewer problems for Japan’s “peace constitution,” which rejects the use of military force as an instrument of national policy. Moreover, some Japanese argue that, for a country without Japan’s particular constitutional arrangements and historical aversion to nuclear weapons, the natural response to the emergence of a regional nuclear threat would be to acquire a nuclear deterrent of one’s own, an option that is not open to Japan, but for which some equivalent must be found. During the cold war, Japan relied on the United States extending its nuclear deterrent to Japan, as a substitute for a deterrent of its own. With the end of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, in which U.S. and Japanese interests were highly congruent – and with the United States far less inclined to rely on nuclear deterrence for its own security – many Japanese argue that it is imprudent for Japan to continue to regard the U.S. nuclear guarantee as an adequate assurance of Japan’s security against nuclear threats. With a Japanese nuclear deterrent barred by both constitutional arrangements and national sentiment, missile defense is an obvious option.

Moreover, a distinctively “Japanese” defense, instead of continued total reliance on the U.S. nuclear guarantee, is seen by some Japanese as a useful symbol of a somewhat more autonomous Japan doing more to take care of its own defense – while remaining strongly linked to the United States by technical arrangements for cooperative development, production, and operation. Viewed from this perspective, missile defenses have the advantage of bringing some measure of reduced dependence on the United States, while simultaneously being highly congruent with U.S. programs and preferences. In short, missile defense can be seen – and portrayed to the Japanese people – as maintaining the U.S.-Japanese security relationship, but doing so in a somewhat more balanced way. In the terms of a senior military official, “missile defense can be the glue for future U.S.-Japanese security relations.”

⁹ The United States has also become involved in the controversy surrounding the highly publicized case of Hitomi Soga, who was abducted from Japan in 1965 at the age of 19. She later married a U.S. soldier, Charles Robert Jenkins, who deserted from his unit in South Korea in the mid-1970s and faces charges if he leaves North Korea to join his wife. At this point, it is unresolved if he and their two children will be permitted to leave North Korea and, if so, whether or not he will be prosecuted by U.S. authorities.

Architecture

Preliminary cooperation between Japan and the United States on a missile defense for Japan has a long history, going at least as far back as discussions during the Nakasone era in the 1980s, when Japan was among the possible partners in the U.S. strategic defense initiative. Discussions of cooperation continued, primarily at a technical level, through the mid-1990s. Following the 31 August 1998 *Taepodong* test, Japan agreed to participate with the United States in technical cooperation on development of key components of a sea-based system for interception of intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

Work on sea-based systems is a natural focus for Japanese efforts. Japan already has Aegis-equipped destroyers (7,250 ton *Kongo* class, equivalent to the U.S. *Arleigh Burke* class), on which an initial sea-based missile defense system would be based. Moreover, for reasons of geography, a defensive system operating from ships in the Sea of Japan between Japan and North Korea is the most obvious approach to defending against North Korean missiles.

In this on-going cooperation program, Japan's contribution has grown from about \$9 million in the first year (1999) to more than \$50 million per year. The work has focused on a lightweight nose cone, an advanced infra-red (IR) seeker, a kinetic energy warhead and a second-stage rocket booster. It appears that the cooperation has gone well at a technical level and Japan has made significant technical contributions. However, a succession of Japanese governments has insisted that this technical research cooperation does not imply any decision by Japan either to cooperate further with the United States on the programs or to procure a missile defense for Japan.

Japan's defense minister (officially "Director General of the Self-Defense Agency") Shigeru Ishiba has urged publicly that Japan move beyond this limited research cooperation. He indicated that he is convinced that Japan needs a missile defense and should move ahead with development and deployment as soon as possible, on the basis of close partnership with the United States. The concept would involve working with the United States on completing the development of a sea-based interceptor system using a second generation Standard Missile and an upgraded SPY-1 radar. The primary mission of the defense would be to provide a limited defense of all Japanese territory against North Korean *Nodong* missiles.

The favored architecture for such a program would be a combination of an upgraded Aegis-derived system, to be developed and produced in cooperation with the United States, and PAC-3, to be purchased. An appropriate combination of the sea-based interceptor system for mid-course intercept protecting broad areas, and PAC-3 for closer-in protection of a few very high priority targets would, as a technical matter, give fairly good coverage for all of Japan. Publicly available technical analyses suggest that two Aegis-type platforms in the Sea of Japan, equipped with an interceptor system with the capabilities that Navy Upper Tier (NUT) is designed to have could provide coverage against the *Nodong* threat for virtually all of Japan. Assuming Japanese maritime forces will continue to be comprised of four flotillas, each including two Aegis missile defense destroyers, a force of at least eight such ships would be required. Given the projected schedule for the NUT system, such a defense could be in place

late in this decade, assuming the United States and Japan can work out arrangements for Japan to deploy the system essentially on the same schedule as the United States.

Eyeing the Future

No political decision has been made to go forward with such a program. It is a truism that in Japan even more than in other countries, a military program like this with important policy and financial implications will only proceed if it commands broad support. Missile defense already has strong support in traditional conservative and security-minded circles,¹⁰ whereas some traditional left-wing and pacifist groups will never support it. Concern about proliferation and the potential of new direct threats to Japan, as well as a modest move toward a more active Japanese international security role,¹¹ mean that commitment to a missile defense for Japan is not impossible. However, broad elements of Japanese public opinion – and powerful forces in the media – maintain a fundamental aversion to a greater Japanese military role. For missile defense to become a serious element in Japanese military programs, therefore, there remains, we were told, a large set of skeptical groups whose support must be won.

The fact that Ishiba, a young, activist Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politician on his way up – characteristics historically not always present in Japan Defense Agency (JDA) directors general – advocates a defense is not only a measure of his own commitment and conviction, and, at least so long as he remains in his position, an indication that the agency will support the program, but also a signal that there is substantial backing for the idea in important governmental and political circles. However, much remains to be done. First, a consensus has to be built in the security bureaucracy, including in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet Office, not only on the need for a defense but on its priority among various government projects in the security field. In parallel, there would have to be agreement by the Ministry of Finance that money for the missile defense project will be found in the context of a national budget outlook that is increasingly tight, because of the continuing problems in Japan's economy. Finally, of course, the Prime Minister, in consultation with his key political allies and advisers, would have to decide to take the major, and controversial, step of committing his government to the program.

The initial decision will be on whether to include funds for the first stages of development in the defense budget that will be submitted to the Diet in August of 2003, work on which will

¹⁰ An expanded program of cooperative development and production would, of course, also bring opportunities to important elements of the Japanese high-tech sector. While industrial and commercial advantages would undoubtedly be factors, both in the public debate and in elite decision-making groups, the missile defense issue is of sufficient political and strategic significance that purely commercial considerations are very unlikely to be decisive.

¹¹ An important symbol of that more active role is Japan's dispatch of naval vessels to support the U.S.-led operation to interdict terrorist shipments in the Indian Ocean by way of a maritime surveillance effort in which many nations participate. At the same time, the limits on Japanese international activity are highlighted by the fact that the Japanese contribution takes the form of providing underway replenishment ships to fuel and re-supply participating nations' warships. Neither the supply vessels nor their escorting destroyers take a direct part in the interdiction operations.

start in the spring of 2003. In support of this process, internal studies of the issue are underway within the security bureaucracies.

The immediate issue of a policy decision to move from “research” in cooperation with the United States to “development” is complicated by the fact that, in Japanese parlance, “development” conveys a strong element of commitment to actual procurement and deployment of a system. By contrast, in U.S. terminology, “development” is a distinct stage of production- and operation-oriented engineering that is beyond “research” on the basic concept and design, but is an intermediate stage that would be followed by a separate formal decision to move on to the final stage of production and deployment. Further confusing matters, the current U.S. concept for missile defense is described as “spiral development,” in which both “research” and “development” will continue, even as some initial operational capability is brought on line. The issue is not, however, simply the (sufficiently formidable) matter of clarifying distinctions between U.S. and Japanese terms that are far from precise in either country’s engineers’ and bureaucrats’ versions of their native tongues, but of facing real differences in policy and decision-making processes on major projects.¹² It does, however, mean that, for Japan, the decision to “develop” a missile defense is more significant politically than would be the case if the question were simply one of moving to “development” in the U.S. sense of the term.

Even in relatively security-minded circles in Japan, missile defense is not without opponents, or at least doubters. As in the United States, there are those who raise questions about the operational feasibility of defenses, that is, about whether they can actually be made to work with sufficient effectiveness to justify the political and financial costs they entail. Questions about effectiveness are the sharper because the North Korean *Nodong* force must be assumed to be substantially more numerous than the putative ICBM force against which the United States’ defense of territory is designed. Others make the point that, even if schedules are met – which is unlikely, given historical experience both in the United States and Japan – it seems probable that the issue of North Korean nuclear programs, and perhaps of the survival of the regime, will have come to a head long before the projected missile defense would be operational, sometime toward the end of the decade.¹³

To some extent, technical doubts are reinforced by the number of U.S. missile defense programs being pursued and uncertainties about which (other than PAC-3) will actually be pushed to deployment, as well as by more technical questions about alleged “turbulence” in the programs, symbolized by such issues as whether the diameter of the missile for the next generation NTW system will be 13.5 inches (that of the current Standard missile) or 21 inches (as proposed in some models). Until the design is completed for this high-acceleration

¹² Indeed, some Japanese experts argued that a good deal of what has been done already in the U.S.-Japanese cooperation program is, in U.S. terms, more “development” than “research”.

¹³ Supporters reply that people have been predicting the definitive solution of Korean issues for a long time, and that, in any event, one plausible – and potentially dangerous – outcome, is the survival of the Pyongyang regime armed with WMD and the missiles to carry them. In that event, missile defenses for Japan would be both militarily and politically useful. Accordingly, for those Japanese who see missile defenses as relevant to Japan’s longer term security relationships with a more powerful China or even a unified Korea, the time that would pass before a defense would be ready is only a marginal objection, and a reason to move forward as fast as possible – not to delay.

boost-and-ascent phase interceptor, it is difficult to know if it is feasible to achieve the required performance with the current launch-tube size.

A commitment to a major investment in a sea-based defense also has implications for inter-service rivalries. By definition, a sea-based system would be procured and operated by the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the *de facto* Japanese navy.¹⁴ If commitment to it meant a shift in resources to the navy and away from the Ground Self-Defense Force, which has traditionally been the most influential and powerful of the services, that service could be expected to oppose the project. Some security observers in Japan argue that such a shift in allocation among the services is long overdue,¹⁵ but acknowledge that such changes are never easy.

On the other hand, if the substantial cost of the system were to come out of an essentially unchanged navy share of the total defense budget, the navy could face serious internal priority issues. In particular, Japan's Aegis ships have hitherto had as their primary mission the defense against air and submarine threat of Japan's sea lines, an essential element in the Japanese economy and the traditional priority mission of its post-war navy. Converting the ships (or configuring the ones yet to be produced) to missile defense could result in a diminished commitment to the sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection role. While several more Aegis-class ships remain to be built, the force is configured for the SLOC protection role – and expanding the total purchase would require more hard-to-recruit-and-retain crews, quite apart from its effect on other aspects of the naval effort.

In reply, advocates of missile defense – many of whom are themselves naval officers, active and retired – take the position that this is a false dilemma: according to current thinking Japan will build at least 8 Aegis ships, a force large enough, they contend, to support both the missile defense and the SLOC-protection missions. Personnel for a modestly expanded Aegis fleet can be found, within current and projected manpower ceilings, by retiring close-in coastal defense ships whose utility in modern operations is limited. Another alternative (one also being explored by the United States) is dual-capable ships that are configured for both the missile defense and SLOC-protection missions, although it remains to be seen if one ship can perform both missions simultaneously and effectively – deployments off the Korean coast are optimal for missile defense, whereas deployments in the direction of Taiwan are more practical for SLOC-protection.

Once consensus is achieved within the bureaucracy and in the LDP leadership, the consensus would have to be extended, and in particular brought to include Komeito, the pacifist-inclined Buddhist-oriented party whose grass roots infrastructure is increasingly important to the electoral success of the LDP-led center-right coalition.

¹⁴ The PAC-3 system, on the other hand, would be an air force (Air Self-Defense Force) system. As such it presents problems of competition with other Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) programs, including the F-2 fighter program (once known as FS-X), and procurement of tankers and cargo planes relevant to a more ambitious Japanese role in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations in distant areas.

¹⁵ One missile defense advocate remarked sarcastically, “The Japanese army and air force are still fixated on fighting the Red Army in Hokkaido.”

In this broader effort, technical questions will be less significant than broad policy concerns. First, missile defense, like any proposed Japanese military program, must pass muster as consistent with the limitations in Article 9 of Japan's constitution.¹⁶ Interpretation of these constitutional limits is the responsibility, at least in the first instance, of a specialized legal staff in the Cabinet Office. During the years since the adoption of the "peace constitution", Japan has interpreted its limits with sufficient flexibility to have made possible the acquisition and operation of its present military forces – which, for all their limited missions, are among the largest and most powerful in the world.¹⁷ To an outsider, it would seem that, given the precedents of acquisition of submarines, Aegis destroyers, and high performance fighters, it would not be difficult to decide that a missile defense is also consistent with Japan's constitutional limits. The distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons systems is always more or less ambiguous, but it would seem that missile defenses fall on the "defensive" side of the line if anything does. However, we were told that critics of missile defenses – and purists on the constitutional issues – can be expected to argue that a system that, like the sea-based one that is the likely centerpiece of a Japanese missile defense, accomplishes intercept far from Japan (and, if the system is employed as a boost phase interceptor, over foreign territory) is not strictly "defensive" in character.¹⁸

The constitutional issue, however, is not limited to whether a missile defense would be "defensive".¹⁹ The Japanese constitution has been understood to restrict Japan's military strictly to the defense of Japan itself and to bar participation in "collective defense".²⁰

¹⁶ Article 9: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

¹⁷ According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) "Military Balance" tables, Japan's defense budget, at about \$40 billion annually, is exceeded only by those of the United States, Russia and China.

¹⁸ The constitutional issue is, moreover, somewhat complicated by the fact that many advocates of missile defense are also advocates of quite fundamental change in the interpretation, if not the text, of the constitutional limits. If the North Korean threat (or longer term concerns about China) were to create substantial public enthusiasm for missile defenses, missile defense advocates might be tempted to argue that, to maximize flexibility in meeting the danger, the occasion should be taken to modify Japan's basic constitutional limitations, instead of merely interpreting the existing terms in such a way that they permit a missile defense.

¹⁹ In addition to issues arising, or said to arise, out of Article 9 of the Constitution, there are other potential legal issues. These include whether a Japanese missile defense system would, given the potential for a defense to make exo-atmospheric intercepts and its inevitable reliance on space sensors and other space-related technology, transgress a 1969 Diet resolution committing the country to strictly "peaceful" uses of space; and whether Japan could, consistent with its restrictions on export of military materials, permit the United States to use technology developed by Japan in its missile defenses – and perhaps to incorporate that technology in sales of missile defense equipment to third countries. On the whole, these legal objections, while very much subjects to be addressed, are unlikely to be decisive. For example, Japan's cooperation with the United States on key technologies for the FS-X (now F-2) fighter aircraft project – some of which are used in U.S. aircraft – has been reconciled with the export control rules.

²⁰ As with much else about Japanese security policy, the scope of this limitation is far from unambiguous. Defense of Japan has been defined, including in the newly revised Defense Guidelines agreed with the United States, to include response to events "in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japanese peace and security". This less than clear-cut phrase has itself been explained, including in the context of Japan's stance regarding a potential crisis over Taiwan, as a "functional rather than a geographic" concept. Moreover, both long-established historical practice and more recent statements have acknowledged that, in the

Insofar as a Japanese missile defense would, for practical reasons, have to be integrated into the U.S. command and control system, questions could be raised as to whether the limit on “collective defense” had been breached. Moreover, some Japanese observers have argued that, with a boost phase system and perhaps even with mid-course intercept, there could be uncertainty about whether the missile to be intercepted was aimed at Japan or at the United States.

To some degree, basic facts about physics and geography reduce the practical significance of this supposed problem: it would be clear from satellites at a very early stage – well before the commitment of an interceptor would have to be made – whether a missile launched from North Korea were aimed at Japan rather than at any part of the United States (except perhaps Hawaii or other U.S. territory in the Pacific Ocean).

However, for both Japan and the United States, the “no collective defense” issue may not be entirely resolved by this observation. Any Japanese system would have to depend to some degree at least on U.S. early warning and tracking; but there would also be pressures to share between U.S. and Japanese platforms responsibility for boost phase intercept on some basis other than the apparent target of the attacking missile. Otherwise, both U.S. and Japanese ships would always have to be in boost phase intercept range of plausible North Korean launch areas. Moreover, this issue has a political dimension: there is some potential for tension on the U.S. side of the security relationship if a Japan that will continue in many essential respects to depend heavily on the United States for its own defense is seen as scrupulously avoiding any possibility that Japan could contribute directly to the defense of the United States.

Probably more important as a factor in the Japanese decision will be the issue of the degree to which a Japanese missile defense would be dependent on active U.S. support if it ever had to be used. Even those Japanese who are most strongly committed to the security relationship with the United States seem to be uneasy about Japan’s defense being entirely dependent on the United States. There is no doubt that any Japanese missile defense would be developed and produced in close cooperation with the United States and that some operational elements would be linked to the United States. However, the Japanese government would seek – and may well need to have, as a political condition of securing support for deployment – to assure its public and key elites that Japan’s defense was under distinctively Japanese control. At a minimum, even if critical warning and communications links were provided by U.S. assets, it would be necessary that final operational decisions for missiles judged to be targeted at Japan – to fire or not, and at what targets – be in Japanese hands.

To some degree, these concerns could be met by such devices as bi-national manning of key command centers, and separate Japanese-operated downlinks from key sensors. However, the need to demonstrate a high degree of autonomy and separate Japanese control is likely to lead to pressures (as it did in the case of intelligence satellites) for solutions that are costly,

event of a renewed North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea, Japan would permit certain uses of U.S. bases in Japan and even provide certain forms of support. These, however, would stop well short of the actual involvement of Japanese forces in actively assisting U.S. and ROK operations on the Peninsula.

not technically optimal, and that involve significant amounts of nationality-based redundancy, but that are politically vital. It seems likely that the Government of Japan will insist that only a Japanese officer be allowed to fire a Japanese ballistic missile as part of Japan's defense system.²¹

On the Japanese side, an almost equally difficult issue related to command and control will be that of allocation of authority to make key decisions. By law, decisions to commit Japanese military forces require affirmative approval by the Prime Minister. Obviously, in the case of missile defense, the timelines are such that the actual decision to launch would have to be made by operational commanders, not personally by the Prime Minister. Accommodating that operational reality might require special legislation. However, the fact that the operational decision to commit an interceptor would be made by a military officer in the control center does not mean that effective control of a defense would have to be delegated to the military. Whoever makes the decision – from the Prime Minister on down – would have to make it under such time pressures and with so little opportunity to consult that the basic decisions on how to employ the system will have to be made in advance, by what are, in effect, engagement algorithms or rules of engagement setting out standards for operating, and committing, the system. Those rules can, and indeed should, be set up by politically responsible authority to be applied in practice by lower-level military officers.²²

Ultimately, Japan's decision on missile defenses will be more a function of its overall response to the security and strategic challenges it faces than of legal and technical considerations. The current greater interest in defenses is a response to the immediate prospect of North Korean ability to reach Japan with missile attacks and to the long-term challenge of the rise of China. This strategic context and political calculations about appropriate responses will shape Japan's missile defense decisions.

In the short run, the gathering crisis with North Korea over Pyongyang's admission that it has been pursuing a nuclear weapons program will be a major factor shaping the Japanese debate. North Korea's nuclear and missile development efforts, coupled with long-standing tensions in Japanese-Korean relations, present Japan with the prospect of a degree of practical vulnerability (the result of technical capability and strategic tension) unknown since at least the Cold War. The emergence of consciousness of a direct threat to Japan from the Pyongyang regime – from the 1998 tests, the abductions, and the nuclear program – has, more than any other factor, put missile defense on the Japanese political agenda, just as it has

²¹ These issues of autonomy will not necessarily arise only on the Japanese side. Given the importance of U.S. military facilities in Japan, the United States may insist on retaining the power to decide whether and how to intercept attacks thought to be aimed at those facilities. For this reason, on both sides, a "two key" system, whereby officers from both nations must agree to launch an interceptor, may be inappropriate. However, the practical difficulties of having truly independent command and control may force a compromise in this matter.

²² Such algorithms or rules must address very difficult issues, such as how to allocate interceptors in the face of attacks that are large relative to the capability of the system or how to reserve interceptors for the possibility of follow-on attacks. However, decisions on the use of interceptors in the event of a detected and confirmed attack, while difficult, are fundamentally less momentous than in situations involving nuclear retaliation or even pre-emptive response to forestall a perceived imminent attack. This factor should make the idea of delegation of authority to intercept under pre-established guidance relatively politically palatable.

forced at least an interruption in the Japanese effort to reconcile and normalize with North Korea.

For Japan, as for the United States and South Korea and all other states concerned with security in the region, there are no terribly attractive options. Japan, not entirely trustful of Washington's crisis management (or indeed, Seoul's capabilities in this connection), and deeply conscious of Pyongyang's unpredictability, is concerned at the risk of miscalculation and unchecked escalation. Any outcome of the current crisis – short of a deal in which North Korea fully and verifiably renounces both nuclear weapons and long-range missile development – is likely to build support for the argument that Japan needs to plan for the possibility of a nuclear-armed North Korea (and perhaps of a nuclear-armed unified Korea) and that, among the various options open to Japan, missile defense is among the least bad. In particular, it offers some prospect of reducing the threat without the risks posed by military action (or even strong diplomatic and economic pressure) being used to stop the North Korean programs.

While Korea provides the short-term context, China provides the long-term challenge. Japanese policy makers, no less than the public, recognize that the gradual modernization of China will almost certainly be the dominant factor in Japan's long-term security situation, and hence a factor in its decisions on missile defense. On the one hand, advocates of missile defense recognize – and the more enthusiastic proclaim – that a side benefit of a defense against North Korea's threat is that it would offer some potential vis-à-vis China. Others, however, maintain with equal conviction – and a good deal more public credibility – that a key principle of Japan's security policy should be avoiding actions that will exacerbate relations with China except with the clearest justification. These Japanese argue that China will view any Japanese missile defense with deep suspicion, and that defenses could be the reason, or at least the pretext, for a dangerous increase in tension with China.

In sum, there is more impetus for Japan to move toward a commitment to a defense against ballistic missile attack than heretofore, but the decision is far from made. There are important technical, industrial, and military questions to be addressed, as well as political and economic issues. The broad strategic context – especially the looming North Korean problem and the long-term challenge of China – will have a major impact. But the issue also presents fundamental questions vis-à-vis the U.S.-Japanese security relationship, if only because any Japanese missile defense will be closely linked to – but must be clearly distinct from – U.S. programs and must fit into the broad framework of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Accordingly, close consultation and cooperation between the U.S. and Japanese governments will be vital.

V. South Korea

Nature of the Threat

If missile defense is a major current policy and procurement issue for Japan and a key element of the broader security debate on Taiwan, the virtual opposite is true in South Korea. This is somewhat surprising given the crisis generated by North Korea's

acknowledgement that it has been secretly pursuing an illicit uranium enrichment program, expulsion of international inspectors, withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and restarting of its plutonium-producing reactor at Yongbyon. These actions were likely designed to put pressure on the United States to negotiate directly with North Korea at a time when Washington is preoccupied with the Iraq crisis. To date, these pressures have not resulted in significant interest on the part of South Korea to press ahead on missile defenses.

Security issues and international relationships – with North Korea, but also with the United States, Japan, and China – are major issues for South Korea and for South Korean politics. As befits a flourishing democracy with a highly complex history, there is a huge range of opinion on these issues in the ROK, ranging from unreconstructed hostility toward the North to the discounting of any prospect of serious conflict with the North and the conviction that reconciliation and secure peace across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) is at hand, with the only real obstacle being the United States.

There can be no question that the center of gravity of South Korean attitudes toward the North has, for the most part, shifted fundamentally in the past decade. President Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" of opening to North Korea and seeking to replace military confrontation with cooperation on economic projects and the beginning of cross-DMZ movement of people had wide support. President Roh Moo-hyun promised to base his presidency on not just continuing this effort, but expanding it, whatever the reservations of the United States or remaining conservative opponents in Korea. Moreover, most South Koreans, convinced that the Pyongyang regime puts a near absolute priority on survival and, mindful of the costs to the Federal Republic of Germany of the rapid reunification with the former German Democratic Republic, believe that, for the foreseeable future, their interests are served by finding ways to promote a "soft landing" in which the North Korean regime does not implode suddenly (with the concomitant risk of lashing out militarily), but rather evolves gradually toward a more open, decent system.

Enthusiasm about the prospect of reconciliation with the North, and, with it, deep skepticism about whether the North represents a real military threat, reflects the view that, for all its continuing military effort, North Korea is basically a weak failing state with a collapsed economy, whose bizarre and isolated regime is focused exclusively on survival and securing foreign legitimacy and economic support, and that it has no serious plans for aggression. This perspective has, for those who hold it, survived virtually intact despite the recent North Korean revelations and Pyongyang's successive steps toward the open pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. Even South Koreans who are deeply appreciative of the U.S. defense of South Korea during the 1950-1953 war and the U.S. protection of South Korea since – and who are more skeptical of the prospects of reconciliation than are most of their compatriots – have no enthusiasm for a military confrontation with the North over Pyongyang's nuclear programs.

Apparently, these developments have had a greater impact in Japan – and perhaps even in China – than in South Korea. In important respects, this seemingly surprising indifference toward North Korean actions (which are regarded elsewhere as major challenges) reflects the

fact that many South Koreans see these North Korean moves as directed largely, and perhaps wholly, at the United States, Japan, and even China, and as having little significance for South Korea. This perspective notes that South Koreans have lived and prospered for generations in spite of North Korea's massive conventional military threat, and indeed its periodic military probing with submarines, patrol boats, border incidents, infiltrators, and, not so long ago, terrorism. South Koreans, it appears, are broadly convinced that North Korea is so weak that nothing – except possibly U.S. provocation – would induce it to attempt a military move. And they are acutely aware that, while a new Korean War would end in total defeat for Pyongyang, the North would have in its power the ability to exact a heavy cost to South Korea. Accordingly, while few if any South Koreans welcome the North Korean WMD and missile programs,²³ they see them as primarily an effort to give Pyongyang some means to threaten Japan and ultimately the United States, but not as a serious increase in the threat to South Korea itself.

The United States, and not just under the current administration, has also seen North Korea as a serious threat, even when, under the Clinton administration, it pursued agreements with the North on specific issues and held out the prospect of normalization. Massive North Korean conventional capability combined with an increased level of forward deployment of that capability, considerable chemical warfare potential, a high propensity to export missile and other military technology, a deeply repressive internal regime and a pattern of outrageous financial demands tempered any U.S. conviction that engagement would prove easy. These concerns have, of course, been underscored by recent events.

Political Context

Unsurprisingly, all this has affected U.S.-South Korean relations. For many Koreans, the alliance with the United States is understood as essential to their security, and the prospect of North Korea adding nuclear weapons to its existing formidable spectrum of military power is nothing to welcome. Nonetheless, there is concern both in public opinion and in all but the most conservative of political circles that the United States exaggerates, not so much North Korea's military potential as the prospect of its use, except as a result of external pressure, and that the U.S. administration unjustifiably discounts both the costs to South Korea of a confrontation and the potential of a policy of cooperation with the North. Moreover, the inevitable tensions of a large U.S. military presence are, for some South Koreans, less and less acceptable since, for these, the U.S. presence no longer seems necessary for their country's protection.²⁴ In fact, many young South Koreans (under age 30) actively oppose a continued U.S. military presence because they believe it deters reunification.

²³ Some U.S. observers – and even some Chinese speaking “unofficially” – attribute the ROK's relative indifference to North Korea's nuclear programs to a supposed highly nationalist Korean view that, in the long run, Pyongyang's weapons would be inherited by a unified Korea, which would find these useful given its position as a small nation squeezed between three “giants” – and, perhaps, abandoned by the United States. While there are undoubtedly South Koreans who believe this – and North Koreans who would be willing to suggest the argument to them – no one we spoke with in Seoul mentioned the argument, except to repudiate it as a myth.

²⁴ There may be legitimate criticisms of the Bush administration's handling of relations with the ROK, but the basic pattern of these divergences in U.S. and ROK perspectives was discernable well before 2001.

These divergences in perspective have a major impact on ROK views of missile defense. While the United States has deployed Patriot batteries to South Korea, and (at least prior to the Iraq war) had given U.S. forces there top priority for PAC-3 deployment, South Korea has evinced practically no interest in missile defenses. In light of the policies of the new president and the general South Korean tendency to discount the possibility of war with the North, it seems extremely unlikely that that position will change in the foreseeable future.

Architecture

However, even should basic South Korean attitudes and policies become much more convinced of a danger from North Korea, it is unlikely that South Korea would have great interest in acquiring a missile defense, simply because of the character of the threat it faces. For the United States, the missile defense problem, in the context of the threat from North Korea or another “rogue state,” is that of protecting against a very limited attack. Even for Japan, the scale of potential attack, while far more daunting than for the United States, is limited by distance. South Korea, by contrast, faces the ultimate “close-in” threat based on what the U.S. commander in Korea has called the “tyranny of distance”: the 10,000-odd North Korean artillery pieces deployed near the DMZ can range deep into the suburbs of Seoul with its population of about 15 million; the 2,000 or so rocket launchers can cover the whole conurbation. Nor are more distant parts of the ROK easily defensible against missile attack. North Korea is the world’s leading producer of short range SCUD-type missiles and their *Nodong* derivatives, and it is assessed to have an inventory of many hundred. These weapons are able to cover the whole of South Korea, making an effective defense highly problematic.

The cumulative threat to the South Korean population is massive, and beyond the capacity of any plausible missile defense deployment to reduce to any significant degree. From the South Korean point of view, it may be realistic for the United States to deploy missile defenses to protect high value targets, like key airfields, ports and command centers, as well as concentrations of U.S. forces in the field. However, strictly from a military point of view, a meaningful defense by South Korea against even the SCUD/*Nodong* element of the North Korean threat is infeasible. South Korean investment in military systems, even if focused on the North Korean threat,²⁵ would, from this perspective, be better devoted to systems with more potential than missile defense.

Eyeing the Future

Accordingly, even if Seoul were both to adopt a fundamentally different attitude toward the threat from the North and to commit to a major increase in investment in military capability,

²⁵ The 2003 South Korean defense budget included a 6.4 percent increase in spending – higher than its growth rate over the last five years, which has averaged 4.8 percent. A continuing, if publicly not much discussed, issue is the degree to which ROK military investments should be, or indeed are, directed to the long-term need of Korea (as a possibly future united country) for deterrence against its bigger neighbors independent of U.S. capabilities as opposed to toward buttressing a joint U.S.-ROK defense against a possible North Korean ground assault.

(neither of which is at all likely) it seems extremely improbable that missile defenses would be a significant part of that effort.

VI. Taiwan

Nature of the Threat

For Taiwan, the issue of missile defense, like every other military, security and foreign policy issue, is an aspect of its uneasy relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC), a relationship that amounts to confrontation in the military field.

In this context, missiles play a major role in the threat that Taiwan faces. The 150 mile-wide Taiwan Strait somewhat relaxes the “tyranny of distance” – or the lack of it – that dominates the Korean military situation. The PRC has a limited amphibious capability; it would be very difficult for it to move a significant ground attack force through Taiwan's air and sea defenses, and it would in any event face, on the beaches of the island, a Republic of China (ROC) army that is large and capable relative to the force the PRC could move across the Strait. The Chinese air force, the People's Liberation Air Force (PLAF), is modernizing and will have increasing long-range capability to strike across the Strait. However, Taiwan has invested heavily in air interceptors and other elements of its air defenses, making a sustained PRC air attack an uncertain business at best. Moreover, a massive amphibious, air or sea attack on the island would be the PRC military move most likely to produce a substantial U.S. intervention.

The limitations on direct cross-Strait operations do not, of course, by any means imply that the PRC lacks military options that would be immensely dangerous for Taiwan. In particular, a campaign of harassment of air and sea traffic into and out of Taiwan is well within PRC capabilities. Such a campaign would have a potentially disastrous effect on the trade on which Taiwan depends for its prosperity, and might be conducted at a level of military commitment, civilian threat and scale of violence low enough to make it politically difficult for the United States to justify intervention.

However, from the PRC point of view, in a military confrontation, an ability to threaten the island of Taiwan would be an important asset, if only because its objective would be not direct conquest, but attaining ROC agreement to the PRC demands for political concessions that had produced the crisis. Presumably with the objective of giving itself just such a capability to strike Taiwan without the uncertainties of an amphibious operation or even a sustained air campaign, Beijing has amassed a substantial missile force and deployed it so as to be able to reach targets on the island. Currently (early 2003) the force amounts to about 400 missiles stationed in range of Taiwan. That threat has been growing and could, of course, be augmented by moving similar missiles deployed elsewhere in China to bring them in range.

This missile force could be used to achieve both political and military objectives. Militarily, it would give the People's Liberation Army (PLA) a means to destroy key facilities, such as air and naval bases, command and control centers and radars, in an effort to negate Taiwan's air

and sea defenses. It would also, and perhaps more importantly, give Beijing a means to hold at risk – or even strike directly at – civilian targets on Taiwan, with the objective of intimidating the population and government, and, by hitting important industrial centers and transportation facilities, interfering with Taiwan’s commerce.

Political Context

As with every other aspect of cross-Strait relations, there is a strong political dimension to the missile defense issue. To some on Taiwan, and to some of Taiwan’s supporters in the United States, U.S. cooperation in Taiwan’s acquisition of a missile defense is most important not for the military effectiveness of a defense, but as a test of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. To Beijing – and to some in the region and in the United States – U.S. cooperation in a missile defense for Taiwan would be a political act far beyond its military implications because it would, they contend, cross a PRC “red line.” Moreover, as discussed in more detail in the China part of this report, Beijing maintains that the nature of missile defense is such that any system defending Taiwan would necessarily have so many links to the United States’ own systems (and perhaps to a putative Japanese defense) as to create an integrated U.S.-ROC defense, and, in substance if not in form, restore the U.S.-ROC military security alliance whose termination was part of the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in 1979.

Officially, Taiwan has not yet asked for permission to buy a missile defense system from the United States, and the latter has not said what it would do if such a request were made. Taiwan has, however, made clear that it is considering missile defenses and wants the United States to agree in principle that these could be provided. The stated U.S. position is that agreement to sell a missile defense system to Taiwan has not been decided upon, but, as a matter of policy, such a sale is not ruled out and the ultimate decision will depend heavily on PRC actions, including with respect to the missile deployments that directly threaten Taiwan.²⁶ Were Taiwan (or, for that matter, the United States) to propose a specific sales commitment, China would almost certainly protest strongly, and the technical issues associated with a missile defense would be overshadowed by the political and strategic aspects.

Views on Taiwan on the missile defense issue are far from unanimous, even among people who are strongly committed to resisting Chinese pressure and maintaining a strong military defense. This variety of views reflects the fact that Taiwan is now a well-developed

²⁶ In this connection, former PRC President Jiang Zemin reportedly proposed to President Bush, during their November 2002 meetings at the President’s home in Crawford, Texas, that China would freeze its missile deployments opposite Taiwan if the United States would commit not to sell missile defenses to Taiwan (or, in some variations, sharply reduce all military sales to Taiwan). Any such exchange is, from the U.S. – not to mention the ROC – point of view, open to the serious objection that the Chinese force is already a substantial threat and that merely “freezing” it does not address the problem to which defenses would be directed, even leaving aside the fact that the missiles in question are relatively easy to move back. So far as the public record shows, the U.S. side rejected the proposal, or at least did not pursue it, and it has drawn relatively little public attention. Should either Taiwan or the United States press the issue of sale of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system to Taiwan, however, China can be expected to call attention to the offer – and its rejection, if only by silence – and revive the idea of some sort of bargain.

democracy in which open debate flourishes. There are on Taiwan very different views on relationships with the PRC and the appropriate priorities for Taiwan's defense efforts, ranging from advocates of formal independence to those who believe in a long-range policy of reconciliation and accommodation with Beijing.

Architecture

Broadly, there are two views regarding the desirability and feasibility of a missile defense, with many individual variations on these two alternative themes.²⁷ The first view, held generally, but by no means universally, among the uniformed military and more traditional foreign policy observers, is that while the PRC missile threat is real, missile defenses are not a very practical course for Taiwan – and almost certainly would not give a military security benefit commensurate with the political costs of the confrontation with the PRC that a decision to proceed with them would entail. This view argues that missile defense is very costly and of limited effectiveness, once one acknowledges that the issue is defending against a threat of hundreds of missiles at, not just at a few key points, but throughout a heavily populated island some 245 miles long and 85 miles wide. A defense would risk being defeated by simple saturation.²⁸ Moreover, any plausible defense depends on relatively few radars and command centers, which are themselves vulnerable to attack if the attacking force is relatively large, as the PLA's force would be. In addition, a meaningful ballistic missile defense requires not just launchers and tracking radars, but a complex and sophisticated command and control system, which only the United States could provide. Ultimately, Taiwan will depend on U.S. assistance if it faces a truly massive attack. However, this school of thought maintains that it is important for the credibility of Taiwan's defense (and for the plausibility of U.S. intervention) that Taiwan have the ability to mount an effective autonomous defense against low level attacks. A system that depends on U.S. active participation from the very outset does not serve that requirement, this school argues.

In addition, those who hold this view argue that Taiwan has far higher military priorities than missile defense. In particular, reforms in the military culture to build a better system of cross-service cooperation and to emphasize operational capability, including training,

²⁷ These two views are those held by people who have a relatively sophisticated understanding of military and strategic matters and who are also strongly committed to maintaining Taiwan's system against PRC pressure but who do not seek formal independence. There are naturally other, more extreme views. These are held by those who maintain that Taiwan has an option to develop a regional missile defense system with Japan and perhaps others; those who suggest that Taiwan can somehow build an active counter-force response to the PLA missile threat and those who argue that a purely political campaign to portray the PRC as a bully because of its missile threats will ultimately force Beijing to eliminate that threat.

²⁸ One of the people we spoke with, who is a strong advocate of a firm line with the PRC and of a strong, if reformed, military defense for Taiwan, pointed to Israel as illustrating the problems that Taiwan would face if it tried to rely heavily on active defenses. Israel, he pointed out, faces a somewhat similar problem of defending a relatively extensive populated area against a numerous threat. It has developed the world's only deployed ballistic missile defense system in the Arrow. However, even Israel, because of the scale of the missile threat it faces, recognizes that defenses could be overwhelmed by a sustained attack and accordingly does not count on Arrow to do more than counter the first salvo or so, and has to look to an active counter attack (whether based on special forces, an unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV]-based system for attacking launchers before they can be reloaded, or something else) as the main method of dealing with the threat. For a host of reasons, active counter attack is not an option open to Taiwan.

integration and readiness – not just accumulation of equipment – are the top needs (and are indeed essential before a missile defense could work). Even in terms of hardware, those who hold this view argue, Taiwan should devote its efforts (which are increasingly restricted by budgetary pressures resulting from a lagging economy and much greater public scrutiny of military programs) to air defenses, anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare, command and control, and other relatively less expensive, more productive systems.

Finally, they argue that, in all probability, even the United States will not have an effective missile defense until late in the decade, and Taiwan will certainly not get one before the United States does. Investments with greater short-term impact would be, they argue, wiser for a military force that faces an imminent threat. As a result, they maintain that the political confrontation with Beijing that a commitment to missile defense would entail could come early, while the payoff of such a commitment, whether large or small, would be delayed many years.

The contrasting view does not dispute the basic technical and military analysis, but takes a more political and psychological approach. It begins with the proposition that the missile threat is a very serious psychological threat to Taiwan and its population because it seems to afford Beijing a capability to bypass Taiwan's defenses altogether. Therefore, the threat requires some direct response by the ROC government and military, specifically a commitment to building some measure of defense. A defense, even if significantly limited in military capability would be highly useful, according to this school of thought. There would be important psychological and morale benefits of having some defense – or even the prospect of some defense in the reasonably near future – rather than none at all. Indeed, a large percentage of the population (claimed to be 80 percent) reportedly favors Taiwan acquiring missile defenses, if for no other reason than to deter threats from the PRC. Moreover, in military and strategic terms, a limited defense would deny the PRC the luxury of absolute confidence in the success of its attack – and at a minimum require a greater commitment, with all the concomitant potential for increasing the political costs to the PRC and the chance of U.S. intervention.

While it may well be true that China would object vigorously, that cannot, this group argues, be a decisive objection. The PRC opposes all significant U.S. military sales to Taiwan, and Taiwan (as well as the United States) will be in a better position to overcome those objections when what is at issue is ballistic missile defense, a purely protective system, than it might be in the case of other, less clearly defensive, systems.

Moreover, an approach that focuses on the psychological aspects of defenses could be shaped in such a way as to deprive the PRC of a definitive decision by the United States over which to provoke a crisis. Specifically, some who take this general view argue that Taiwan could seek, not an outright sale by the United States of a complete U.S. system, but cooperation on development of an “indigenous” system. Any such system would incorporate much U.S. technology, but it would not be a U.S. system. For that reason, the Chinese objection that any BMD for Taiwan would necessarily be integrated with U.S. defenses would be undermined, as would the objection of some on Taiwan that it is not in

Taiwan's interest to rely for limited defense on a system that requires early active U.S. support in a crisis.

The debate thus continues on Taiwan as to how (and if) to pursue BMD, though some small steps toward the realization of a missile defense have already been taken. Taiwan has been acquiring the Mobile Air Defense System (MADS), a Taiwan-unique upgrade of the Patriot system, roughly equivalent in capability to the Patriot 2. In addition, the United States has agreed to sell Taiwan both a phased array radar system and Kidd-class destroyers with surface to air missiles. None of these systems constitutes, in any sense, missile defenses. MADS, the Kidds and the phased array radars have all been presented as simply elements of an improved anti-aircraft defense and, in the case of the radars, an attack warning system – requirements for Taiwan that are at least as important as a missile defense. The United States has consistently maintained that these programs have no meaningful anti-missile capability, and indeed they have none.

Nevertheless, the line between sophisticated air defenses and missile defenses will grow increasingly blurred in the coming years, and each element of the ROC program is potentially part of a foundation for a future missile defense of Taiwan. The phased array radars, if upgraded, could perform critical tracking functions. Later variants of the Patriot system have been, in contrast to their predecessors, including MADS, designed for missile defense. The Kidd-class destroyers have been explicitly offered as gap-fillers until an Aegis-type system can be deployed late in the decade, by which time, if all goes well, the United States may have developed an Aegis-derived system with meaningful missile defense capability.

Eyeing the Future

In sum, for Taiwan, the PRC missile force represents a real threat and therefore stimulates interest in possible defenses. In the short run at least, there are serious practical and priority problems with building such defenses, not to mention the disadvantages of risking a major confrontation with the PRC – and of possibly having to ask the United States to take a step that it would regard as unnecessarily undermining its relationship with the PRC. However, there are also powerful voices on Taiwan that insist that there must be some response to the missile threat, and that a limited defense would entail manageable diplomatic costs and pay substantial psychological and military dividends.

VII. China

PRC Missile Deployments

China has, so far as the public record suggests, no missile defense programs of its own, and certainly no prospect of cooperation with the United States on such programs. It does, of course, have substantial offensive missile programs. The PLA is modernizing its long-range missile force, albeit at a very measured pace, with the apparent objective of replacing its current 20 or so ICBMs in vulnerable fixed silos with a somewhat larger number of mobile DF-21 and DF-31 missiles, with ranges suitable to reach Russian and U.S. targets respectively. In addition, the PLA has, as noted in the discussion of Taiwan, several hundred

shorter range missiles deployed in range of Taiwan, with more in other parts of the country. Some part of this deployment, and perhaps part of the DF-21 program as well, has an ongoing collateral objective of sustaining a strong missile strike capability against India.

Political Context

The U.S.-PRC Dynamic

Most of the Chinese interviewed expressed opposition to all U.S. missile defense programs, and to all prospective cooperation by the United States with defenses for others in the region. But they did so in relatively muted tones, reserving their strongest opposition, predictably, for any form of U.S.-ROC cooperation.

With respect to the U.S. commitment to develop and gradually to deploy a limited national missile defense of the United States itself, the reaction in Beijing tends to be relatively more nuanced than in similar discussions in the past. Arguments made two or three years ago about how a defense of U.S. territory would “stimulate an arms race” or “defy international opinion” or “vitiate arms control”, are repeated, but in a relatively low key way. Russian acquiescence in the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty seems likely to have seriously undercut any inclination by the Chinese to make outright and vigorous opposition to a U.S. territorial defense a centerpiece of its international strategy.

Indeed to some degree, the theme of Chinese comments on the U.S. program is one of studied indifference and even scorn. Chinese observers claim to find it strange that the United States, in the midst of the threat from global terrorism, would be devoting so much energy and political capital to a system that even its strongest advocates have to acknowledge has no application to the struggle against terrorism. Chinese experts are well informed about criticisms of the U.S. program on technical grounds – ranging from countermeasures to alternative delivery by means other than ballistic missiles – and echo those criticisms, arguing more that NMD is a waste of U.S. effort than that it is a great problem for China.

If Chinese military and political leaders believe that the U.S. system represents a threat to China’s own nuclear deterrent – which it seems likely they do (especially when combined with the new U.S. “preemptive” doctrine) – this theme is not much deployed as a major element of “unofficial” criticism of the programs. It would, however, be wrong to imply too much from this change of tone: China seems likely to have concluded that the United States will go ahead with some form of national missile defense, and that it is no longer an option for China to build a strong front with Russia to extract a heavy political cost from the United States for doing so, much less to stop the program. That being the case, China has nothing to gain from suggesting publicly that the program is a great threat to Chinese interests, and every incentive to discount the effort as a pointless diversion from the real priorities of the United States.

The Regional Dynamic

The Chinese are clearly opposed to potential U.S.-Japanese missile defense cooperation. However, this opposition is in the context of general concern about an expanded Japanese role in Asia-Pacific security overall, rather than specific objections to Japan having a missile

defense as such. Not surprisingly, given China's focus on Taiwan specifically and on Japan as a resurgent regional power generally, the most pointed criticism of the Japanese effort was concern that a Japanese defense would be interlinked with the United States and Taiwan to form a regional ballistic missile defense system, directed not at North Korea or other "rogue states", but at China.

This concern with regional security is echoed in Chinese comments on the issue of North Korea's nuclear programs. Chinese experts repeat the familiar (but not necessarily therefore insincere) line that China wants a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and hint at a concern that eventually any North Korean nuclear weapons would end up in the hands of a unified Korea and could be aimed at China. No doubt the Chinese also recognize that North Korean WMD programs, and particularly those aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons and long range missiles, give impetus to Japanese programs to build missile defenses – and perhaps even acquire a nuclear capability – as well as to U.S. plans to build defenses that, in the Chinese view, potentially compromise their deterrent or at least require its modernization at a faster pace than they would prefer. While thus proclaiming a direct Chinese interest in seeing the North Korean nuclear programs being dismantled, they oppose any attempt to use coercion on Pyongyang, and disclaim any special influence over the DPRK regime.

For all the genuine efforts of Japanese and Chinese leaders alike to work out a *modus vivendi*, there clearly remains a degree of mutual suspicion, particularly on the Chinese side. This distrust of Japan carries with it a PRC tendency to see a potential revival of Japanese imperialism and militarism that is wholly disproportionate to Japan's actual actions, which remain highly circumscribed. To what extent these protests are the product of continuing anger at Japan's past record and resentment at the hesitancy and limits of Japan's acknowledgement of that record, and to what extent they are a deliberately calculated over-reaction to pre-empt any effort by Japan to rival China's ambitions as the primary regional military power, is necessarily a matter of speculation, but it is clear that such objections are strongly felt.

If, as these criticisms of a potential Japanese missile defense would imply, China's principal concern with Japan's military programs is with their potential to support a more active international security role for Japan, missile defenses are a poor target, on objective grounds. The kinds of defenses Japan is considering would be focused on protection of Japan itself; they would not provide a means for Japan to project power or to seek to convert its continuing, if somewhat diminished, economic advantages in the region into military might and political influence.

Predictably, the strongest Chinese comments on missile defense are those related to possible U.S. support for a missile defense of Taiwan. The Chinese continue to maintain that a U.S. decision to sell Taiwan a defense system, much less to cooperate in its installation and operation, would set off a major crisis in U.S.-Chinese relations. Significantly, even in this context, the objections are not primarily to the prospect of Taiwan having some measure of defense, but to missile defense cooperation as a symbol of renewed U.S.-ROC military cooperation. The Chinese regard, or profess to regard, cooperation on ballistic missile defense as in a separate and even more objectionable category than other U.S. military sales

to Taiwan. In this view, all military sales of any significance violate what China views as President Reagan's commitment in the 1981 communiqué gradually to reduce and eventually to eliminate such sales. But the Chinese maintain missile defense cooperation would necessarily entail so many and such close exchanges of data and operational linkages as to amount to a *de facto* revival of the U.S.-ROC security alliance, which the United States agreed to discontinue as part of the 1979 arrangements for normalization. As such, missile defense cooperation is in an almost unique class,²⁹ violating both the 1979 and 1981 undertakings, as interpreted by the PRC.

Eyeing the Future

Decisions on the “real” Chinese response to a U.S. missile defense will be made in highly restricted government and Party circles and manifested publicly only as the actions decided upon work their way through development, testing, and deployment. One likely element of the Chinese response is a greater commitment to a more survivable, and probably more numerous, ICBM force. However, given that the effort to develop such a capability began long ago, and that the originally planned pace and scale of that effort is unknown, the outside world may well not know for a long time, if ever, how much U.S. missile defense programs affected Chinese ICBM modernization. However, it would appear to be in the U.S. interest to provide as much transparency as possible about U.S. missile defense programs so that China is not encouraged to hasten its modernization programs since the U.S. systems – as planned – are not intended to handle the sophisticated Chinese threat. The United States might also initiate discussions on shared early warning data with China to help assure strategic stability.

VIII. India

Nature of the Threat

A closer strategic relationship with the United States, including support for U.S. missile defense programs, enjoys broad backing in both of the leading political parties in India. Part of the attraction of missile defense in India is that it focuses on the problem of missile proliferation. India has been powerless to deal with the proliferation of Chinese missiles and technology to Pakistan. As such, many Indians are hopeful that U.S. missile defense technology will provide a counter to the proliferation of Chinese missile technology. Furthermore, to the extent that India can gain access to U.S. missile defense technology, it may also complicate military planning in Pakistan, and weaken the deterrent effect of Pakistan's nuclear force.

While China is often cited in India as a potential long-term threat, that relationship is now being managed well by both sides. The two countries continue to work on border and other

²⁹ Chinese objections to operational cooperation between the United States and Taiwan are by no means limited to BMD. Beijing made similar claims in respect to U.S. efforts, begun under Clinton, but enthusiastically continued and expanded under Bush, to work with the ROC military on “soft” issues of training, jointness and force integration, arguing that these areas necessarily involve direct military-to-military cooperation, not just sales of equipment.

issues through regular, high-level meetings. China, in particular, has consistently moved to reduce tensions with India in recent years.

Pakistan poses the more immediate threat to India by supporting terrorist activities in Kashmir (Pakistan, of course, argues that the insurrection in Kashmir is the indigenous product of India's policies). In these efforts, India maintains that Pakistan has applied many of the lessons learned from supporting the Mujahedeen struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and is presenting India with a long-term asymmetrical war of attrition. In response to this longstanding problem, India developed a "limited war" strategy to pressure Pakistan to give up what Indians term a "jihadist terror strategy" in Kashmir. The Indian limited war approach involves responding with military operations at a level well above terrorism, but below the nuclear threshold. This strategy implies that Pakistan's nuclear weapons may not deter India's willingness to go to war with Pakistan over Kashmir. Thus, a major concern is the risk that a military confrontation over Kashmir will set off a cycle of escalation that neither side wants and that could result in catastrophic costs for both.

Political Context

India, in publicly endorsing President Bush's missile defense efforts early on, gambled that this would not put it at odds with Russia. The Foreign Secretary announced India's support for the U.S. administration's approach to national missile defense the day after President Bush presented his vision and made the case for withdrawing from the ABM treaty – and the day before a visit to India by the Russian defense minister.³⁰ This move surprised many strategic thinkers in India because the missile defense issue had not been widely debated and the endorsement seemed to represent a departure from India's traditional opposition to U.S. hegemony and unilateralism. The move also signaled closer strategic alignment between India and the United States after relations were strained by India's 1998 nuclear weapons tests.

In supporting missile defenses, the government argued that the systems were the inevitable result of advances in technology, that they may provide a transition to a new international security architecture and that they are consistent with India's minimum deterrence policy. Furthermore, the political gamble paid off when Russia subsequently decided to acquiesce in the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty and to downplay its opposition to the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

A few months after the Indian endorsement of U.S. missile defense programs, the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States reinforced these geopolitical realignments and opened new opportunities to reverse the earlier downturn in U.S.-Indian security relations. By 2002, Russia, China and India no longer posed the kind of strong international opposition to U.S. missile defense programs noted only a few years earlier. India and the United States are now "natural allies", according to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. However, the U.S. need to seek support for its campaign to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan also led to a revived, if often uneasy, U.S.-Pakistani partnership,

³⁰ The U.S. vision was provided by President Bush in his 1 May 2001 speech at the National Defense University. The Indian endorsement followed on 2 May 2001.

upsetting hopes Indians (and many in the U.S. administration) had for a decisive shift in U.S. policy on Indo-Pakistani issues.

Similarly, there remain some concerns in India about possible adverse consequences of U.S. missile defense developments. For example, some argue that China may accelerate military programs to counter future U.S. missile defense systems, thus also enhancing China's military potential with regard to India. More worrisome is the possibility that some of these newly developed Chinese capabilities could be exported to India's potential or current rivals, especially Pakistan. Similarly, some Indians worry that the United States might provide important missile defense technology to Pakistan. Military competition in space also seems to be a troubling area for India. Many, no doubt, also worry that the pattern of dramatic ups and downs in U.S.-Indian relations will be repeated at some point.

To date, however, momentum is growing toward better U.S.-Indian relations. The United States has followed through on President Bush's promise that there will be "real consultations" with other countries on missile defense. Senior officials have been dispatched to engage India in talks about missile defense and the regional security environment. These efforts have included bringing Indian officials to the United States for more detailed discussions on missile defense programs and plans. Such transparency helps ensure that expectations on both sides remain realistic.

Architecture

While the Pakistani missile threat has been characterized as "too many, too close," India is still interested in exploring missile defenses that might be helpful in preventing blackmail, even if they fall short of providing an effective defense against a large scale missile attack. As a result, Russian, Israeli and U.S. missile defense systems are of interest. India is also interested in missile defense research collaboration with the United States. The benefits of research and development across the wide range of technologies involved in missile defense are attractive because of their potential applications well beyond the missile defense arena.

While Indian officials are fully aware of tight U.S. restrictions on technology transfer, they also point out that India has done an excellent job in controlling its own nuclear weapons and missile technology, despite strong interest on the part of other countries. India also has expressed an interest in purchasing other U.S. arms in an effort to diversify arms suppliers; Russia currently provides about 70 percent of India's foreign military acquisitions. However, how far and how fast U.S.-Indian missile defense relations progress is a function of many political, economic and regional security considerations, so it is too early to judge with any confidence the prospects for more extensive cooperation at this point.

Eyeing the Future

Missile defense has not been as contentious an issue in India as it has in Japan and Taiwan, probably because India feels less threatened than these countries. This suggests that the missile defense issue may be considered more from a geopolitical perspective, than more narrowly in terms of threats. Nevertheless, Indian decisions on missile defense will have

important tactical and strategic implications, especially for Pakistan and China, so the context of the missile defense debate in India bears close watching.

If significant U.S.-Indian cooperation on missile defense emerges, care needs to be taken to assure both Pakistan and China that such efforts do not signal a shift in U.S. relations with these two important countries. Otherwise, Pakistan may be inclined to reduce cooperation in the war on terrorism and China could be less than helpful on a wide range of issues, including North Korea and Taiwan. The key is for the United States to frame missile defense cooperation in the broadest context so that in attempting to address one problem, it does not exacerbate several others.

IX. Concluding Observations and Recommendations

A key question for policymakers and military planners is what will be the net effects of missile defense deployments on regional security in East Asia. Our conclusion is that, if it continues to be managed well, the development of missile defenses in Asia need not lead to instability. However, this assessment should not lead to complacency on the part of the United States or others. An ongoing and comprehensive dialogue on missile defense will be needed at many levels and in many fora in order to ensure stability and predictability.

So Far So Good

The long lead times for developing and deploying missile defenses, combined with the transparency of programs and regular briefings abroad by U.S. officials, suggest that deployment of missile defenses in East Asia need not be destabilizing. Most of the systems currently in research and development will probably not be ready for fielding for several years and even when deployed, China should be confident that they do not pose a threat to its deterrent capabilities. Indeed limited missile defense capabilities should not be seen to threaten the regional military balance, although they would provide an important measure of defense against the North Korean threat and blackmail by North Korea and others, as well as against errant missile launches.

The beginnings of a necessary, comprehensive regional dialogue on missile defense have been established. Not surprisingly, much of the focus is on military technologies. Information about threats and missile defense systems under consideration for East Asia is easily available and considered generally adequate to respond to most questions about effectiveness, appropriate architectures, and estimated costs.

Far Yet To Go

Such a dialogue will be necessary to ensure regional security and prevent the development of erroneous assumptions about what kinds of missile defenses may be deployed, where, and in what timeframe. The possibility of erroneous assumptions is serious because of the wide diversity of views of missile defense in the United States and Asia, both within and between countries. For example, missile defense does not carry the same sense of urgency and high priority in Asia that it does in the United States. A deeper understanding of the concerns

and capabilities of the Asian countries will help ensure that expectations and assumptions in the United States and East Asia are realistic.

The more challenging part of the dialogue is geopolitical. A host of national sovereignty, national security, bilateral alliance, regional security and economic issues are involved in decisions about the future deployment of missile defenses in East Asia. As these issues are discussed and factored into planning and strategy, they should be assessed both in terms of their unique national characteristics and also their likely overall impact on regional security.

Japan

Missile defenses for Japan have both political and military advantages: they respond to a real threat from North Korea that is by no means certain to be negated by other measures and, at a political level, they can help transform the U.S.-Japanese security relationship into a more balanced system adapted to future conditions.

Both the United States and Japan should base their actions regarding missile defense cooperation on the proposition that the U.S.-Japanese security relationship is a fundamental pillar of stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Properly handled, missile defense cooperation can strengthen that relationship by adapting it to new threats and giving Japan a greater role. But equally, misunderstandings over missile defense could threaten the underlying relationship.

North Korean nuclear and missile programs that threaten Japan – and potentially the United States as well – are among the major threats that missile defenses can address. However, missile defenses cannot be the only answer to the challenge of North Korean programs, if only because of the time required to develop and deploy effective defenses. U.S.-Japanese cooperation on other, more immediate measures, including diplomatic efforts in coordination with China and South Korea, will also be necessary.

The United States should continue to cooperate vigorously with Japan on technical work on a sea-based missile defense that could potentially meet both U.S. and Japanese requirements. This cooperation should be marked by a flexible policy on technical cooperation, consistent with security and legitimate commercial interests on both sides, and, even more, by high-level policy dialogue on the broader implications of missile defense.

As the United States continues to cooperate with Japan on missile defenses, it needs to recognize that, for Japan, a decision to move forward to deployment would be a major political and strategic step. It should be clear U.S. policy that, while it will continue cooperation at a technical level and believes there is a strong case for missile defenses, whether Japan should deploy such a system or not is the sole decision of the Japanese political process. Overt pressure on Japan to deploy would likely be counterproductive – both in regard to Japan's missile defense decision and to the broader U.S.-Japanese security relationship.

A Japanese decision to go forward with missile defenses would raise concerns in China and, to some degree, in other Asian countries as well. The United States and Japan should work together to ensure that there is sufficient public discussion and diplomatic dialogue with others in the region to avert misunderstanding with respect to the scale, capability and purpose of U.S.-Japanese missile defense cooperation.

South Korea

The U.S.-South Korean security relationship has come under virtually unprecedented strain in recent months. Both sides need to reiterate that the relationship remains highly important to the security of the two nations and to stability in the region as a whole. Policy on specific issues should be developed in the context of that necessary relationship. This encompasses U.S. decisions on adapting force deployments as well as South Korean policy toward the North, specific measures to deal with the North Korean threat and South Korean attitudes toward the U.S. military presence.

The United States should continue to deploy advanced defenses against short-range missiles to protect critical U.S. (including joint U.S.-South Korean) military assets, such as command centers, airfields and sea ports.

For the foreseeable future, however, missile defense cooperation with South Korea aimed at providing a defense of the population, or even of the bulk of South Korea's military assets, from North Korean attack is simply not a key issue, for both technical and political reasons.

Taiwan

Taiwan has a legitimate concern that Chinese missile programs are aimed at intimidation and at deterring U.S. protection of Taiwan in the face of a Chinese military threat. Consistent with the long-standing U.S. insistence that force not be used in the cross-Strait conflict, the United States shares that concern.

Accordingly, the United States should not rule out providing Taiwan with access to missile defenses that would blunt, if not defeat, any hypothetical use of PRC missiles. U.S. policy on missile defense for Taiwan should be geared to the scale of the threat and to Taiwan's self-defense needs. The United States should refuse any proposals by China to trade a "freeze" on further missile defense deployments opposite Taiwan for a ban on U.S. missile defense assistance – much less limits on broader U.S. military sales to Taiwan – because such a freeze would leave a large unanswered threat in being.

At the same time, both the United States and Taiwan should recognize that missile defenses, quite apart from any political implications for cross-Strait and U.S.-Chinese relations, would provide only very limited defense, given the scale and quality of the PRC missile capability facing Taiwan. Furthermore, missile defense costs would be high and compete with other, arguably higher-priority, needs to modernize and reform Taiwan's military capabilities. Therefore, the scale and character of U.S.-ROC cooperation on missile defenses should, like other defense cooperation, be geared to both real military needs and the overall strategic

interests of the two sides, and not become a test either of the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan or of Taiwan's commitment to its own self-defense.

China

Whatever the stated motives and architecture of U.S. defenses against long range missiles and of cooperation with Japan (and potentially others in the region) on missile defenses, China will inevitably see in those actions a potential challenge, both political and strategic. That will be the case even for a strictly national defense of U.S. territory, but particularly for cooperation on missile defenses for Japan and, of course, for Taiwan.

Some of that reaction is irreducible. However, China has no prescriptive right to unchallenged missile dominance in the region. The actual capability of defenses now under development will be very limited against the missile capability, both intercontinental and regional, that China will have by the time the defenses are operational. The United States – and Japan and others in the region – needs to ensure that missile defense programs are sufficiently transparent and well-explained that China does not over-react to them, either politically or in terms of its own military programs.

China shares with the United States and its regional allies, including Japan and South Korea, an interest in preventing North Korea from acquiring mature missile and nuclear weapons capabilities. These countries also share an interest in a stable and constructive U.S.-Chinese strategic relationship. U.S. missile defense policy needs to recognize these broad common interests.

U.S. policy on missile defense cooperation in the region should therefore combine firmness about U.S. commitments to its alliance relationships with a sustained effort to maintain a constructive, non-confrontational relationship with China. Multi-level dialogue and transparency, as well as modulation of rhetoric, will be key elements in such an effort. In that effort, the United States should consider the potential of an arrangement to share early warning information with China, on the model of existing cooperation with Russia.

India

The new geopolitical environment is far more conducive to strategic cooperation between the United States and India than during the Cold War. Yet U.S.-Indian relations seem to follow a cyclical pattern; improvements create high expectations but eventually problems – often related to Pakistan – come up, which ultimately lead to setbacks. If the current phase of improving relations is to be sustained, it will be essential to build more stable Indo-Pakistani relations. This will require political leaders on both sides to temper the strong nationalist sentiment and rhetoric that fuel confrontation. At the same time, they should be encouraged to build multiple ties along the many dimensions of mutual interest, especially water and access to energy resources.

As U.S.-Indian cooperation on missile defense and other issues develops, it should be reviewed regularly in terms of the broader strategic context and the implications for sensitive

regional military balances, especially with Pakistan and China. This cooperation will also likely involve third countries, such as Israel, with implications that also need to be placed into a broad strategic context.

Acronyms

ABL – Airborne Laser
ABM (Treaty) – Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty)
BMD – Ballistic Missile Defense
DMZ – Demilitarized Zone (At the 38th Parallel, Korean Peninsula)
DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”)
GBI – Ground Based Interceptor
ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IISS – International Institute for Strategic Studies
IR – Infra-Red
JASDF – Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JDA – Japan Defense Agency
LDP – Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
MADS – Mobile Air Defense System
MEADS – Medium Extended Air Defense System
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAW – Navy Area-Wide
NMD – National Missile Defense
NPT – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTW – Navy Theater-Wide
NUT – Navy Upper Tier
PAC(-3) – Patriot Advanced Capability(-3)
PLA – People’s Liberation Army (China)
PLAF – People’s Liberation Air Force (China)
PRC – People’s Republic of China (“China”)
ROC – Republic of China (“Taiwan”)
ROK – Republic of Korea (“South Korea”)
SLOC – Sea Lines of Communication
THAAD – Theater High Altitude Antimissile Defense
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

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